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INTRODUCTION 1
Perceptual decisions are not only based on current sensory evidence, but also influenced by the 2 choice history. Across a wide range of perceptual decision-making tasks, observers tend to 3 repeat their decisions more than is expected by chance ( Padoa-Schioppa, 2013). In summary, choice history biases appear to be a general feature of 10 decision-making. 11
Why does choice history bias occur? This is an especially good question given that, in most 12 laboratory experiments, stimuli are uncorrelated across trials. Repeating previous choices is 13 consequently detrimental to task performance; choice history biases are maladaptive in the 14 contexts of such tasks. However, they are likely adaptive in natural conditions, as our 15 environment usually remains relatively stable over short timescales (Dong & Atick, 1995; 16 Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001) . Crucially, observers can exploit this stability by leveraging 17 information from the recent past in order to stabilize perceptual decisions against disturbing internal representations in this manner would manifest itself in a tendency to repeat previous 20 decisions. Choice history biases that persist despite uncorrelated input may be a consequence 21 of our prior expectation that our environment tends to be temporally correlated. 22
Bayesian theories of perceptual decision-making prescribe how previous information should be 23 integrated with current information in a probabilistically optimal manner (Vilares & Kording, 24 6 Thirty-eight naïve participants (23 female/15 male, age range 18-34 years) recruited through the 1 university pool took part in the experiment. Subjects were paid 8 euros an hour for their 2 participation. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided written 3 informed consent before the start of the study. The study was approved by the local ethical 4 committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and was in accordance with the 5
Declaration of Helsinki (2008 version). 6
We performed an a-priori power analysis that resulted in n = 34 to obtain 80% power for 7 detecting at least a medium effect size (d ≥ 0.5) with a two-sided paired t-test at an alpha level of 8 0.05. Four participants were excluded from our original sample: one did not complete all 9
sessions, one was excluded after training due to failure to follow task instructions, and two were 10 excluded due to technical errors during the experiment. These participants were replaced with 11 new participants. 12
Apparatus & stimuli 13
Visual stimuli were generated with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997 population of dots was split into "signal dots" and "noise dots". The signal dots moved in the 21 motion direction of the trial with a velocity of 11.5°/s. If signals dots left the aperture, they were 22 redrawn on the opposite side. Three different sequences of dot motion (at the same coherence 23 and direction) were presented in an interleaved fashion, making the effective speed of signal 24 dots 3.83°/s. The noise dots changed position randomly from frame to frame. The percentage of 1 signal dots defined the motion coherence, a measure of motion strength. 2
Procedure 3
In each trial of the experiment, two white random dot motion stimuli were presented on a black 4 background successively for 750 ms, separated by a 250 ms inter-stimulus interval. The first 5 stimulus was always a reference stimulus of 70% motion coherence. The second stimulus was a 6 test stimulus with a higher or lower motion coherence than the reference. The difference in 7 motion coherence between reference and test stimuli was taken from one of three sets, chosen 8 on a participant-by-participant basis (procedure described below): easy (1.25, 2.5, 5, 10, 20 and 9 30%), medium (0.625, 1.25, 2.5, 5, 10 and 30%) or hard (0.3125, 0.625, 1.25, 2.5, 5 and 20%). 10
Both stimuli had the same mean motion direction, and the motion direction of any given trial was 11 randomly offset between 30° and 330° from the motion direction of the previous trial. 12
Participants were asked to give two responses in order: first, they indicated whether the test 13 stimulus had lower or higher coherence than the reference (coherence response); second, they 14 reported how confident they were about their decision on a 1-4 point scale (confidence report). 15
For the coherence response, they used their right hand to press either the 'j' or 'k' button on the 16 keyboard. The button mapping for indicating lower or higher coherence of the test stimulus was 17 counterbalanced across participants. For the confidence report, participants used their left hand 18
to press the corresponding 1-4 digit buttons on the left-hand side of the keyboard. Participants 19 had 4.75 seconds to give both responses, starting from the onset of the test stimulus. If they 20 failed to give both responses in the correct order within the time limit, they received auditory 21 feedback consisting of a low tone, played through headphones during the inter-trial interval. The 22
sequence of coherence differences between the reference and test stimuli was pseudo-23 randomized across trials, such that every coherence difference was preceded equally often by 1 every other coherence difference (Brooks, 2012). 2
Participants completed three sessions of which one practice session and two data collection 3 sessions. During the practice session, participants received instructions about the coherence 4 discrimination task and performed one or more simplified practice blocks of 48 trials each, in 5 which they only had to judge the coherence difference without rating their confidence. Next, a 6 staircasing procedure was used to estimate an individual threshold of 70% accuracy in the 7 coherence discrimination task using the QUEST algorithm (Watson & Pelli, 1983 ). Participants 8 completed at least 3 blocks of 48 trials each after each of which the convergence of the 9 threshold estimate was visually inspected. Based on the resulting threshold, one of the three 10 stimulus sets was chosen: for thresholds below 5% and below 10% coherence difference, the 11 hard and medium stimulus sets were selected, respectively. As a result, 2 participants were 12 assigned the easy set, 22 participants the medium set, and 10 participants the hard set. After the 13 staircasing procedure, participants received instructions for the additional confidence report and 14 practiced the complete task with their stimulus set for the rest of the first session (9 blocks of 48 15 trials, 432 trials total). 16
The two data collection sessions started with one refresher block of 48 trials. Then participants 17 completed 15 main blocks of 48 trials for each session, resulting in 1440 total trials per 18
participant. 19
Participants received auditory feedback about the correctness of their decision during the 20 practice blocks and refresher blocks only. This feedback consisted of a brief high or low tone for 21 correct and incorrect decisions, respectively, played through headphones during the inter-trial 22
interval. Participants always received on-screen written feedback about their general 23 performance (percentage correct, average response time, and missed trials) in each block. was presented at fixation, followed by a test stimulus with a different coherence but with the 4 same mean motion direction. Participants gave two responses: first, they indicated whether the 5 test stimulus had higher or lower coherence than the reference, using the 'j' and 'k' button on the 6 keyboard; second, they reported their confidence on a scale of 1-4. If they failed to give both 7 responses, they received auditory feedback during the ITI. 8 9
Data cleaning 10
Trials in which one or both responses were missing and trials where participant gave a 11 coherence response within ≤ 300 ms from the onset of the test stimulus were removed from 12 further analyses. Consequently, 184 out of 48,960 trials (0.38% of all trials) were discarded. 13
Deriving choice repetition from psychometric functions 1
In order to quantify the choice repetition bias and its modulation by previous evidence, response 2 time, and confidence, and qualitatively compare findings to previous studies, we first employed a 3 psychometric function fitting approach. We estimated choice repetition independently for each 4 condition, following the analytical approach of earlier studies ( We first expressed the probability of a "higher coherence" response (P(rt = 1)) as a function of 7 the signed coherence difference between the reference and test stimulus (̃) and fit a 8 where λ and γ were the probabilities of stimulus-independent errors ('lapses'), g was the logistic 11 function, α was perceptual sensitivity, and δ was a bias term. The free parameters λ, γ, α and δ 12
were estimated by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the data (using MATLAB's 13 fminsearchbnd). We constrained λ and γ to be identical to estimate a single, choice-independent 14 lapse rate. 15
For the quantification of serial choice bias, we first split the data into two bins corresponding to 16
the previous choice such that one bin contained all trials for which the participant previously 17 reported "higher coherence" while the other bin contained all trials for which they reported "lower 18 coherence". For each level of previous absolute evidence strength (st-1) within these bins, we 19 further split the data by previous response time (rt; based on a median-split) or previous 20 confidence (low ratings (1, 2) and high ratings (3, 4) ). For each of those subsets of trials, we fit 21 the psychometric function as described above. In order to compute the choice repetition bias, 22
the resulting bias terms δ were transformed from log-odds into probabilities by the inverse logit 23 function = /(1 + ). This probability reflects ( = 1|̃= 0), which is the probability to 1 choose "higher coherence" in a hypothetical ambiguous trial (no evidence) in the current trial. 2
For each bin we subtracted these values across the two previous choice options, which yielded 3 the pooled measure of choice repetition probability. Finally, to test for differences in choice 4 repetition probability, or p(repeat), across bins, we performed repeated measures ANOVAs 5 using SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 2015). 6
History-dependent multiple regression model 7
While the approach described above allowed us to compare the current results to previous 8 studies on choice repetition, it suffers from the problem that previous trial characteristics, such 9 as evidence strength, response time, and confidence report are correlated ( Figure 2 ). Splitting 10 data according to one of these variables will partition meaningful variance in the other variables 11
as well, which can introduce or mask apparent influences of any one variable on choice 12
repetition. Furthermore, since the above analysis is focused on the biasing influence of the 13 previous choice, it is not clear what role the previous stimulus information itself plays in biasing 14 subsequent visual processing. To overcome these problems, we devised a history-dependent 15 regression model, which allowed us to estimate separate influences of current and previous 16 stimulus variables and response variables. 17
Specifically, we constructed a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with a binomial link 18 function to predict the current choice based on current and previous stimulus and response 19 variables as well as their interactions. The factors in this regression model can be conceptually 20 split into current-trial factors and history factors, where the current-trial factors describe the 21 stimulus information (i.e. evidence direction, evidence strength, and interactions) on the current 22 trial, and the history factors describe the stimulus information and response characteristics (i.e. 23 choice, response time, confidence report, and interactions) of the previous trial. 24
We were interested in the influence of the previous choice on current choice. Accordingly, we 1 added the effect of previous choice (prev choice) as a factor to the model. To examine whether 2 the influence of the previous choice is larger when participants were confident about that choice, 3
we included an interaction factor (prev choice x prev confidence) to the model. Similarly, to 4 examine whether the influence of the previous choice was greater when participants had 5 responded quickly, we also added this interaction factor (prev choice x prev rt). Furthermore, as 6 the influence of the previous choice may scale with the strength of absolute evidence for that 7 choice (i.e. the coherence difference between the reference stimulus and test stimulus), we also 8 included this interaction factor (prev choice x prev |evidence|). Note that these three interactions 9
are all theoretically related to decision confidence: more evidence leads to a more confident 10 decision, just as a lower response time and higher reported confidence reflect a more confident 11
decision. 12
It is important to note that, due to the difficulty level being staircased, there is a ~70% correlation 13 of previous choice and previous evidence direction (i.e. the sign of the evidence, determining 14
whether it was a "higher coherence" or "lower coherence" trial). This raises the question whether 15 it is the previous choice or the previous evidence direction that influences the current perceptual 16 decision. To investigate this, we added the previous evidence direction (prev evidence dir) to the 17 model, as well as all interactions equivalent to those we included for previous choice. This 18 included interactions with previous confidence (prev evidence dir x prev confidence), previous 19 response time (prev evidence dir x prev rt), and previous absolute evidence (prev evidence dir x 20 prev |evidence|, equivalent to the signed evidence of the previous trial). 21
All factors included thus far describe history effects. However, observers' decisions are primarily 22
based on the bottom-up information present in the current trial. To account for this, we included 23 the signed evidence of the current trial to the model (curr evidence dir x curr |evidence|). 24 13
Finally, we included the main effects of all variables in the aforementioned interactions (with the 1 exception of prev choice and prev evidence dir, which were already included). Accordingly, we 2 included prev confidence, prev rt, prev evidence, and curr evidence as factors to the model. 3
Note that these main effects by themselves provide no information about the identity of either the 4 previous or current trial, nor information about the previous choice, and were therefore unlikely 5
to provide information about current choice. Consequently, they were not expected to be 6 significant factors in the model. The reason they were nevertheless added was to prevent that 7 an unexpected significant modulation would express itself as an interaction and hence be 8
misinterpreted. 9
Before constructing the model, variables were re-coded as follows. Categorical predictors choice 10 and evidence dir were coded using effect coding (-1/1). Confidence was subject-wise centered 11
and subject-wise scaled by its standard deviations. For the response times we used a robust z-12 score and removed the subject-wise median and scaled by the subject-wise median absolute 13 deviation (constant = 1.48). We scaled the unsigned evidence to range between 0 and 3, to 14 accommodate smaller parameter estimates to prevent numerical floating-number overflow. 15
We used the R-package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) to fit a generalized linear model from the 16 binomial family. We fitted a model with 'subjects' as the only random grouping factor. We 17 included for each fixed effect its corresponding random slope coefficient, but without random 18
correlations, as the model did not converge. Even with this simplification, the random effect 19 structure was singular, but the model converged according to the lme4 convergence checks. As 20 a robustness check, we re-fit the data with a Bayesian GLMM using brms (Bürkner, 2017 (Bürkner, , 2018 ) 21
with an LKJ-prior of 2 on the correlation matrix which confirmed all of our findings. For 22 significance testing we report Walds-Z test. Walds Z-test is valid only in the asymptotic regime 23 assuming a multivariate normal sampling distribution of parameters and a proportional sampling 24 distribution of the log likelihood to χ 2 . Therefore, we will be very conservative in our interpretation 25 of the reported p-values if the effects are not obvious from effect-sizes alone. To check whether 1 the model can adequately capture our data, we plotted and compared fitted marginal against 2 aggregated raw marginal data. Mimicking posterior predictive tests, we simulated new datasets 3 from our model and compared the observed simulated data distributions with the observed one 4
and generally found our data to be well captured. The goal of the current study was to investigate the modulation of sequential choice biases by 8 subjective decision confidence, motivated by the seemingly conflicting roles of previous 9 response times and stimulus evidence. 10
To this end, thirty-four human observers performed a binary forced choice coherence 11 discrimination task on random dot motion stimuli. As expected, stronger absolute evidence 12 resulted in higher accuracy (Figure 2a ), faster response times (Figure 2b) , and higher subjective 13 confidence reports (Figure 2c ). In addition, higher confidence reports were associated with 14 higher accuracy and faster response times, which are often considered an implicit measure of 15 decision confidence. These findings suggest that the subjective confidence reports are a 16 meaningful reflection of decision confidence. confidence reports increased with evidence strength for correct responses and decreased with 12 evidence for incorrect responses (Figure 2c ). An exception to this pattern were incorrect 13 responses based on the strongest evidence, where response times were faster and confidence 14 reports higher. 15
In line with previous research (Urai et al., 2017) , we observed an increase of choice repetition 1 after fast choices (Figure 3b ). We confirmed these observed patterns by performing a repeated 2 measures ANOVA, testing the effect of previous absolute evidence strength and previous 3 response time on the choice repetition values we derived. This revealed a main effect of 4 previous response time, with increased choice repetition for previous fast compared to slow 5 choices (main effect of previous response time: F(1,33) = 32.708, p < .001). In addition, we 6
found an interaction between previous response time and previous evidence (F(5,165) = 2.961, 7 p = .014), indicating that the effect of previous response time was not equal across all levels of 8 previous evidence (see Figure 3b ). This main effect of response time was confirmed by our 9
history-dependent regression model, indicating that previous response times negatively 10 modulated the impact of the previous on the current choice ( Figure 4 ; prev choice x prev rt: b = -11 0.12; bootstrapped 95% CIs = -0.14, -0.09; p < .001). In other words, participants were more 12 likely to repeat their choice after a fast response. Error bars represent between subject SEMs. 8 9
Choice repetition increases after confident choices 10
This modulation by response time has been previously interpreted as evidence that choice 11 repetition increases after confident responses. We next sought to test the role of confidence 12 more directly by relating choice repetition to explicit subjective confidence ratings. To this end, 13
we performed a repeated measures ANOVA on the pattern observed in Figure 3c , testing the 14 effect of previous confidence rating and previous absolute evidence strength on the choice 15 repetition values we derived. This showed a complexly varying modulation of choice repetition 16 by previous subjective confidence across different levels of previous evidence strength ( Figure  17 3c; interaction previous confidence and previous evidence strength: F(5,165) = 7.918, p < .001; 18 main effect of previous confidence: F (1, 33) = .444, p = .510). It is likely that the effect of previous 19 confidence was difficult to derive from this analysis because of multicollinearities in the data. The 20
history-dependent regression model accounts for this, and clearly revealed that previous 21 confidence positively modulated the impact of the previous on the current choice (Figure 4 ; prev 22 choice x prev confidence: b = 0.066; bootstrapped 95% CIs = 0.03, 0.10; p < .001). In other 23 words, participants were more likely to repeat previous choices made with high confidence, even 24 after adjusting for previous response time and previous evidence strength. We found that choice 1 repetition increased following high subjective confidence reports. 2
Choice alternation after previous high stimulus evidence resembles adaptation 3
Next, we investigated whether choice repetition was modulated by previous evidence strength. 4
In line with Akaishi et al. (2014) , the psychometric analysis showed that choice repetition 5 decreased after stronger previous evidence strength (Figure 3b ; main effect of previous 6 evidence F (5, 165) = 13.550, p < .001). This may appear paradoxical in light of our earlier 7 described findings, as trials with strong evidence have faster response times and higher 8 confidence ratings (Figure 2 ), which would be expected to lead to an increase in choice 9
repetition. Strikingly, our model revealed that choice repetition was not significantly modulated 10 by the strength of the previous evidence (prev choice x prev |evidence|: b = -0.017; bootstrapped 11 95% CIs = -0.10, 0.05; p = .662), contradicting our previous psychometric analysis. These 12 contradicting findings raise the question if, and how, the strength of the previous evidence 13 modulates the current choice. 14
The answer to this question may lie not with the choice history, but with the stimulus history. The 15 previous stimulus information could potentially affect the encoding of current stimulus 16 information, which in turn could bias the current choice (Kohn, 2007; Thompson & Burr, 2009; M. 17 A. Webster, 2012 Webster, , 2015 . It is therefore important to account for the influence of the previous 18 stimulus information . 19 Indeed we found that whereas current choices are biased towards the previous choice (prev 20 choice: b = 0.25; bootstrapped 95% CIs = 0.16, 0.35; p < .001), they are simultaneously biased 21 away from the previous evidence direction (prev evidence dir: b = -0.041; bootstrapped 95% CIs 22 = -0.08, 0; p = .042). This is particularly noteworthy as evidence direction and choice were 23 correlated: 70.4% (SD = 3.8% across subjects) of choices corresponded to the evidence 24
direction. Yet, the coefficients have opposing signs. We also found that the repulsion away from 1 the previous evidence direction increased when this evidence was stronger (prev evidence dir x 2 prev |evidence|: b = -0.23; bootstrapped 95% CIs = -0.30, -0.15; p < .001). This resembles a 3 classical adaptation effect, which is typically stronger following strong adaptor stimuli ( Thompson 4 & Burr, 2009 ). However, note that in our design, observers' choices are based on the coherence 5 difference between two dot motion stimuli, and it is this difference that induces the observed 6 effect. Consequently, our observed effect is not identical to a classical adaptation effect. 7
These findings reveal that the apparent and puzzling increase of choice repetition with 8 decreasing evidence strength found by Akaishi et al. (2014) (Figure 3b ) may in fact not be a 9
modulation of the influence of the previous choice, but a modulation of the influence of previous 10 sensory evidence on current sensory processing. In summary, we find that choices are biased 11 towards the previous choice, a bias that grows when people were faster and more confident on 12 the previous trial. Simultaneously, choices are biased away from the previous evidence 13 direction, a bias that grows for stronger previous evidence (Figure 4 ). Perceptual choices are not only based on current sensory information, but are also 5 systematically biased towards the recent history of previous choices. In the current study, we set 6 out to test how choice repetition bias is modulated by aspects of the choice history as well as 7 stimulus history. Specifically, we investigated the role of decision confidence on the probability to 8
repeat the same choice on successive trials. Confidence deduced from response times and pupil 9 dilation suggest that people are more likely to repeat previous choices (Braun et al., 2018; Urai 10 et al., 2017) , in line with an optimal integration of previous and current information in a stable 11 environment. In apparent conflict, confidence deduced from sensory evidence suggests that 12 observers are more likely to alternate from previous confident choices (Akaishi et al., 2014) . To 13 resolve this conflict, we measured decision confidence with explicit confidence ratings where 14 previous studies probed decision confidence indirectly via response times or pupil dilation. 15
We found that observers were more likely to repeat confident as well as fast choices. This is in 16 line with the previous findings from indirect measures of decision confidence and confirms the 17 role of decision confidence in positively modulating choice repetition. Furthermore, we found that 18 choice repetition decreased with increasing evidence strength on the previous trial, in line with 19
Akaishi et al. (2014) . Crucially however, our history-dependent regression model revealed that 20 previous evidence did not modulate the transfer of successive choices, but rather the influence 21 of the previous trial, as current choices were found to be biased away from the evidence 22 direction on this previous trial. 23
The role of decision confidence on choice repetition 24
According to Bayesian theories of perceptual decision-making, prior information is integrated 1 with sensory input in a probabilistically optimal manner (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Vilares & Kording, 2 2011 ). Such theories would predict that prior information is leveraged more strongly if the 3 uncertainty associated with this information is low; consequently, perceptual choices should be 4 more strongly biased towards previous confident choices. Our findings are in line with these 5 predictions: people are more likely to repeat previous confident choices. However, we cannot 6 conclude from our data that this integration occurs as described by, and is optimal according to, 7
Bayesian theories. 8
An open question is what underlying mechanism is modulated by decision confidence. One 9 candidate mechanism would be the process of evidence accumulation, as recent finding shows Previous studies into the influence of confidence on choice repetition in forced choice paradigms 4 used proxy measures for confidence, such as pupil dilation and response times. In this study, we 5 assess confidence using a subjective report measure and also measure response times, and 6
find that both modulate choice repetition. An open question that remains is whether subjective 7 confidence and confidence as assessed with response times have independent contributions to 8 choice repetition probability. It should be noted that in our data, confidence reports and response 9
times were correlated with each other and were both correlated with evidence strength, which 10 modulated the influence of the previous stimulus on the current choice. One may wonder 11 whether this multicollinearity in our data affects the interpretability of our model estimates. 12
However, the reported confidence intervals of the parameter estimates suggest that the 13 influence of these variables is robust, which points towards the interpretation that all these 14 variables have independent contributions to choice repetition modulation. Further research 15 needs to be conducted to further investigate this interpretation. 16
The role of stimulus history on choice repetition 17
At first glance, our finding that observers' choices are biased away from the previous evidence 18 direction and that this bias grows with evidence strength resembles a sensory adaptation effect 19 as frequently described in the literature (Kohn, 2007; Thompson & Burr, 2009 ; M. A. Webster, 20 2004 Webster, 20 , 2012 Webster, 20 , 2015 . However, it is important to consider that in our experimental design, 21
observers made judgments about the difference between a reference stimulus and a test 22
stimulus. 23
Our history effects cannot be explained by sensory adaptation to motion. The main reason for 1 this is that we changed the motion direction at least 30 degrees from one trial to the next. The 2 varying motion direction should prevent any patterns of motion adaptation across trials. Sensory 3 adaptation can however explain the within-trial effect of a general response bias towards 4 perceiving the test stimulus as less coherent than the reference stimulus (Figure 2a ), as within a 5 trial both stimuli always had the same motion direction. 6
As our findings resemble but cannot be explained by sensory adaptation, this raises the question 7 from which neural population(s) and at what stage of the decision formation process our 8 adaptation-like modulation arises. We hypothesize that the adaptation arises not from a 9 population of sensory neurons which encode the motion coherence, but rather from a neural 10 population which encodes the accumulated (difference in) motion coherence. Also, we 11 hypothesize that neural adaptation away from this difference should occur at a stage after this 12
difference is computed from the bottom-up sensory evidence but before this evidence is showed a repulsive adaptation effect in the absence of an attractive serial dependence effect, 22
when they removed the influence of late modulatory feedback by visual backward masking . 23
These findings suggested that attractive and repulsive effects may jointly but independently 24 contribute to perceptual experience. Indeed, we show that choice history and stimulus history 1 bias our perceptual experience in opposite directions yet in tandem. 2 3
CONCLUSIONS 4
We find that perceptual choices are biased towards the previous choice, a modulation that grows 5 with previous decision confidence and previous response times, and are biased away from the 6 direction of previous evidence, a modulation that grows with previous evidence strength. These 7 findings suggest that previous choices and previous stimuli induce separate biases on 8 subsequence choices through distinguishable and complementary mechanisms, pointing 9 towards a complex process of decision formation. 
